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Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Right
to Direct Suit Against an Insurer by a Third
Party Claimant
By Joan Marion Price*

In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Sufperior Court,' the California

Supreme Court ruled that an insurer may be held directly liable to a
third party claimant for refusing in bad faith to settle a claim against its
insured. In recognizing a direct third party action under the Unfair
Practices Act,2 codified in the California Insurance Code, Royal Globe
upset the rule announced in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co. 3 that an

insurer's duty to settle runs to the insured, not to injured third parties.
At issue in Royal Globe was whether a person injured by the al-

leged negligence of an insured may sue that party's insurer directly for
a violation of the statutory duty to deal in good faith. The Royal Globe
analysis of this issue involved three subsidiary questions. First,
whether a private civil litigant is entitled to commence a lawsuit against
a violator of the Unfair Practices Act for damages incurred by reason
of violation of the Act or whether the Act is intended to be solely a
regulatory scheme vesting exclusive enforcement power in the Insurance Commissioner. 4 Second, if the Act is intended to afford a private

right of action for damages, whether that right extends to injured third
parties.5 Third, if the right extends to injured third parties, whether
such parties may sue the insurer and the insured in the same lawsuit or

6
whether there must be a prior determination of the insured's liability.

The court decided in the plaintiff's favor on the first two questions
B.A., 1971, Queens College of the City University of New York; M.S., 1972, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Second Year Class.
1. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
2. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980).
3. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976). See text accompanying
notes 33-39 infra.
4. 23 Cal. 3d at 885-88, 592 P.2d at 332-34, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-47.
5. Id at 888-91, 592 P.2d at 334-36, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847-49.
6. ld at 891-92, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50. Defendant Royal Globe
contended that the Unfair Practices Act, upon which the action was based, was part of a
regulatory scheme intended to allow only the insurance commissioner to invoke specified
sanctions against insurers who fail to conform to the Act, and only when such failure is so
frequent as to indicate a general business practice. Id. at 887, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 846.
*
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but dismissed the action in Royal Globe as premature, concluding that
the plaintiff could not sue both the insurer and the insured in the same
lawsuit.7 This was done to prevent the introduction of prejudicial evidence of liability insurance in an action against the insured. 8 This ruling on the timing of the action, however, does not diminish the
importance of the court's decision that a third party claimant may sue
an insurer for violating Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivisions
(h)(5) and (h)(14) 9-portions of a regulatory statute which prohibits insurers from engaging in certain enumerated unfair claims settlement
practices. 10
This Note assesses the court's action in Royal Globe. The Note
first reviews the historical development of the judicial doctrine of bad
faith failure to settle as grounds for an insurer's tort liability to its insured. Next, the Note discusses the legislative development of a regulatory scheme controlling the insurance industry which culminated in the
enactment of the Unfair Practices Act. After a brief overview of the
facts of Royal Globe, the Note turns to an analysis of the court's two
holdings in favor of the plaintiff. Considering first the majority's decision to grant a private right of action under the Unfair Practices Act,
the Note concludes, in accordance with the dissent, that the ruling in
Royal Globe is based on a strained interpretation of Insurance Code
section 790.03(h). Moreover, the decision does not comport with the
goal of the legislation, which is to empower the Insurance Commissioner to better protect the insurance-buying public. Nonetheless, assuming judicial recognition of the private right of action, the Note then
argues this right should not be extended to third parties, contrary to the
ruling in Royal Globe, for this needlessly increases a third party's rights
far beyond those recognized under judicial tort theory. Finally, the
Note considers legislation proposed in response to the wave of protest
from the insurance industry following Royal Globe which would overturn the effects of the decision.
Extra-Contractual Liability of Insurance Companies: The Tort
of Bad Faith
The insurance policy, a technical instrument unilaterally prepared
by the insurer and seldom understood by the insured," is today depended upon increasingly to provide financial security against unfore7.

Id at 891, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.

8.

fd

9. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5), (14) (West Supp. 1980).
10. See note 53 infra.
11. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-71, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 107-08 (1966); Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 626, 631-34, 107 P.2d
252, 256 (1940) (per curiam).
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seen losses through numerous forms of coverage. Thus, insurance
contracts are necessarily affected with a public interest. This interest,
together with the tremendous power wielded by the insurer,' 2 has led
courts to impose on insurance carriers an implied in law duty to deal
13
fairly and in good faith with insureds.
This implied covenant of fair dealing and good faith requires that
the insurer not put its own interests ahead of its insured.14 This requirement in effect imposes a duty to attempt settlement where the risk
of a judgment in excess of policy limits exists. If this duty is breached
and liability is determined in excess of policy limits, a cause of action
for bad faith arises.' 5
The tort of "bad faith" is a judicially-created doctrine of fairly
recent origin. 16 The California Court of Appeal established in Brown v.
GuaranteeInsurance Co. 17 that bad faith breach of the duty to settle,
negligence, should be the basis of the insured's cause of acand not
tion.' 8 The court held that it was not necessary for the insured to have
12. The parties rarely have equal bargaining power or expertise. Gray v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-71, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966).
13. This implied in law duty assumes that "neither party will do anything which will
injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Comunale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
14. Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 660, 320 P.2d 140, 146 (1958).
15. Bad faith cases can be divided into first party and third party situations. In a third
party bad faith situation, an insured with a limited liability policy is being sued by an injured claimant. The liability appears clear and the potential damages could exceed policy
limits. The insurance company is presented with a reasonable offer to settle the claim for an
amount within policy coverage. If the insurer refuses to settle, the insured will be exposed to
the danger of a verdict in excess of liability coverage. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). A third party case typically arises where an insured, whose liability is determined, assigns his or her right of action for bad faith to the
claimant to satisfy the amount of the judgment. In a first party case, on the other hand, the
plaintiff is an insured. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but court discusses bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
16. One of the earliest cases to impose the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing on insurers was Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930),
afd on rehearing,204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931). The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
that liability insurers who in bad faith refused to settle when faced with claims against their
policyholders would be liable for the full amount of the judgment. The court's rationale was
that the conflict of interest between insurer and insured necessitates close scrutiny of the
conduct of the insurer to assure the insurer's good faith in considering its insured's interests.
Id at 8, 231 N.W. at 260.
17. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
18. A checklist of factors to be considered in determining if bad faith exists appears in
the decision. The factors listed were "the strength of the injured claimant's case on the
issues of liability and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to
a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain
the evidence against the insured; the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or
agent; failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of
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paid the excess verdict, or any part of it, to create liability in the insurer
for the full amount of the judgment. 19 Moreover, the cause of action
against the insurer,
whether sounding in tort or in contract, was held to
20
be assignable.
In 1958, the California Supreme Court first addressed the subject
2
of insurer bad faith in Comunale v. Traders & GeneralInsurance Co. 1
In Comunale, the defendant insurance company's wrongful failure to
defend was coupled with a refusal to settle within policy limits, resulting in the insured's liability for amounts in excess of the policy limits.
The court, in considering the insurance company's liability for these
excess amounts, stated that the "implied obligation of good faith and
fair dealing requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case although the express terms of the policy do not impose such a duty."2 2
The court acknowledged that cases in which this implied obligation
generally arose were those in which the insurance company, having assumed the defense on behalf of the insured and thus controlling the
litigation, refused to settle the case. In such situations, the court noted,
23
the insurer's liability extended to amounts beyond the policy limits.
Turning to the situation at hand, the Comunale court considered
that "[t]he decisive factor in fixing the extent of [the insurer's] liability
is not the refusal to defend; it is the refusal to accept an offer of settlement within the policy limits. ' 24 The court reasoned that "an insurer
who not only rejected a reasonable offer of settlement but also wrongfully refused to defend should be in no better position than if it had
assumed the defense and then declined to settle."' 25 Consequently,
Comunale held the insurer liable for the amounts in excess of the insurance policy limits, based on its bad faith refusal to settle.
In 1967, in the landmark case of Crisci v. Security InsuranceCo. ,26
the California Supreme Court imposed tort liability on an insurer for a
bad faith failure to settle a claim against one of its insureds. 27 Relying
financial risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; the fault of the
insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the
facts; and any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part of the insurer." Id at 689, 319 P.2d at 75.
19. Id at 689-90, 319 P.2d at 75-76.
20. Id at 693-94, 319 P.2d at 78.
21. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
22. Id at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
23. Id at 660, 328 P.2d at 201-02.
24. Id at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
25. Id at 660, 328 P.2d at 202.
26. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
27. The plaintiff, an elderly immigrant widow whose principal asset was an apartment
house, had a $10,000 liability policy with Security Insurance Company. A tenant fell
through a defective step on an outside stairway and was left hanging 15 feet above the
ground for some period. The tenant sustained only minor physical injuries but developed a
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on Comunale's proposition that the implied covenant "requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case,"'28 the Crisci court concluded that
"[liability is imposed not for bad faith breach of the contract but for
failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements. '29 Evidence
was held not to be
showing actual dishonesty, fraud, or concealment
30
faith.
bad
for
action
of
cause
a
for
essential
The duty of an insurer to deal fairly and in good faith with its
insured in determining whether to settle is, under Comunale and Crisci,
owed by an insurance company to its insured. Logically, imposition of
such a duty is intended to protect the insured from the risk of excess
liability, not to bestow any benefit upon injured third party claimants.
This point is demonstrated in the California Court of Appeal case of
Shapero . Allstate Insurance Co., 3 where the insured died leaving no
assets. Therefore, a judgment in excess of policy limits presented no
risk to the insured or his heirs. The court held that the insurer had no
duty to settle within policy32limits because there was no risk to the insured of an excess verdict.
That the principle behind the duty to deal fairly and in good faith
is to benefit the insured is illustrated further in Murphy v. Allstate Insursevere psychosis. The case was one of clear liability for the physical injuries, but there was a
conflict among psychiatrists over whether the psychosis was a proximate result of the accident. Before trial the insurer rejected a settlement demand of $9,000, even though Mrs.
Crisci offered to pay $2,500 of that amount. The company offered no more than $3,000, the
value of the physical injuries alone. A jury awarded the tenant $100,000 and her husband
$1,000. The insurer's attorney who ultimately defended the case had predicted this verdict
and had recommended settlement. The verdict was affirmed on appeal, and the insurance
company paid its $10,000 policy limit. Mrs. Crisci lost her property, became indigent, and
both physically and emotionally ill. Id
28. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958).
29. 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
30. Id The court in Criscinoted: "[I]n determining whether to settle the insurer must
give the interests of the insured at least as much consideration as it gives to its own interests
.... " Id at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. Thus, it would appear to be always
in the insured's interest to settle within policy limits when even a slight danger exists of a
verdict in excess of those limits. The Criscicourt strongly sympathized with amicus curiae,
who argued that an insured who purchases a policy of limited liability is justified in assuming that a sum of money equal to the policy limits is available and will be used to avoid
excess liability in any accident covered under the terms of the policy. Consequently, it
would be unjustifiable for an insurer to further its own interests by rejecting a settlement
offer at or near policy limits and gambling with the insured's assets. If settlement is not
made, amicus argued, the insurer should always bear the risk of any excess liability. Id. at
430-31, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. However, the lower court had found that the
insurer did not give as much consideration to the interests of the insured as it did to its own
interests, so it was unnecessary for the supreme court to adopt the strict rule proposed by
amicus curiae. Id at 431-32, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
31. 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971).
32. Id at 438-39, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
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ance Co. 33 In Murphy the California Supreme Court unanimously
ruled that neither the third party beneficiary theory nor any other theory considered by the court could extend the duty of the insurer directly to a third party.3 4 The court considered the principles underlying
the insurance carrier's implied in law duty to settle and reasoned that
the benefits of the duty do not inure directly to the injured third party
claimant. 35 Indeed, the claimant "usually benefits from the duty's
breach,"' 36 for, rather than receiving a settlement at or near policy limits, the claimant stands to obtain a judgment exceeding policy coverage. 37 The court stated its conclusion emphatically:
A third party should not be permitted to enforce covenants
made not for his benefit, but rather for others. He is not a contracting party; his right to performance is predicated on the contracting parties' intent to benefit him. .

.

. As to any provision made

not for his benefit but for the benefit of the contracting parties or for
other third parties, he becomes an intermeddler. Permitting a third
party to enforce a covenant made solely to benefit others would lead
to the anomaly of granting him a bonus after his receiving all intended benefit. Because, as we have seen, the duty to settle is intended to benefit the insured and not the injured claimant, third
doctrine does not furnish a basis for the latter to
party beneficiary
38
recover.

The Murphy court explained that an "insured may assign his or
her cause of action for breach of the duty to settle without consent of
the insurance carrier, even when the policy provisions provide the contrary." 39 Thus, should the injured party receive a judgment against the
insured in excess of the policy limits, the insured could assign his or her
cause of action to the injured party who then could satisfy the judgment by an action against the insurer.
After Murphy, the law was firmly established that the duty of the
insurer to settle a bona fide claim runs only to the insured and not to
the injured claimant. The remedy of the injured party was clear: a suit
against the insured. The insured, in turn, had standing to sue the carrier directly for a breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing and
33. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
34. The court considered, and rejected, direct actions by the injured party under the
third party beneficiary theory based on California Insurance Code § 11580, CAL. INS. CODE
§ 11580 (West Supp. 1980) (establishing required policy provisions), and under California
Code of Civil Procedure § 720, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 720 (West 1955) (permitting action
by judgment creditor against debtor of judgment debtor). 17 Cal. 3d at 942-46, 553 P.2d at
557-60, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427-30.
35. 17 Cal. 3d at 944, 553 P.2d at 588, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
36. Id at 941, 553 P.2d at 586, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
37. Id at 941-42, 553 P.2d at 586-87, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
38. Id at 944, 553 P.2d at 588, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
39. Id. at 942, 553 P.2d at 587, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427. (citing Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 661-62, 328 P.2d 198, 202 (1958)).
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good faith if the insured had wrongfully refused to settle and a judgment exceeding the policy limits was rendered. The injured claimant
could obtain an assignment of this cause of action to proceed against
the insurance company.
Statutory Regulation of the Insurance Industry and the Private
Right of Action
The insurance industry, subject to control through judge-made
doctrines such as the tort of bad faith failure to settle, also is controlled
in California by statutory regulation. 40 California appellate courts
have granted a private right of action based on this statutory scheme,
enacted after the development of the tort remedies discussed previously.41 An analysis of this private right of action shows, however, that
the appellate courts intended that it parallel the bad faith failure to
settle tort.
Regulation of the business of insurance historically has been considered exclusively within state control. The business of insurance
originally was held not to constitute "commerce" within the meaning of
the commerce clause;42 thus, the insurance industry was to a large extent immune from federal regulatory controls. In 1944, the Supreme
Court halted exclusive state regulation of the business of insurance by
its decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.43 The Court held that insurance constitutes "commerce" and,
therefore, that Congress had intended the Sherman Antitrust Act to
apply to insurance. 44 To enable the states to retain autonomy in insur45
ance regulation, Congress declared, by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
that the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts and the Federal Trade
only to the
Commission Act are applicable to the business of insurance
46
law.
state
by
regulated
not
is
business
extent such
In an attempt to foreclose the assertion of jurisdiction over insurance practices by the Federal Trade Commission, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) drafted a model act 47 in
40. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980).
41. See notes 42-86 & accompanying text infra.
42. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
43. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
44. Id at 552-53.
45. Pub. L. No. 15, 59 Stat. 33-34 (1945) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1976)).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). The constitutionality of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
47. 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 392-400, An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance (1947). The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is a voluntary association of state
insurance regulators.
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1947 which provided a system of state supervision of unfair trade practices in the insurance industry. 48 In 1959, California, via the Unfair
Practices Act, 49 adopted in substance the provision of the NAIC model
act.50 Like the NAIC model act, the California provisions were
designed to regulate trade practices in the California insurance business and thereby, through the McCarran-Ferguson Act, avoid federal
5
supervision. '
The operative provisions of the Unfair Practices Act, codified in
the California Insurance Code, warrant specific mention here. Section
790.03 defines the acts prohibited as unfair methods of competition or
unfair and deceptive practices in the business of insurance.5 2 In 1972,
subsection (h) was added to section 790.03, prohibiting insurers from
"[k]nowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice" any of thirteen unfair claims settlement practices.5 3 This section, patterned on a revised model act
48. 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 392, An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition
and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance § 1 (1947).
49. Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1737, § 1,at 4187 (codified at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10
(West 1972 & Supp. 1980)).
50. See notes 47-48 & accompanying text supra.
51. CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1972). Section 790 provides: "The purpose of this
article is to regulate trade practices in the business of insurance in accordance with the intent
of Congress as expressed in the [McCarran-Ferguson Act] by defining, or providing for the
determination of, all such practices in this State which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined
or determined." This statement of purpose parallels that in the NAIC model act. 2 NAIC
PROCEEDINGS 392, An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance § 1 (1947).
52. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1980).
53. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 725, § 1, at 1314. The thirteen unfair claims settlement practices
were:
"(I) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverages at issue.
"(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
"(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
"(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof
of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
"(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
"(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
"(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a
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54 was later expanded to include two addideveloped by the NAIC,
55

tional unfair practices.
The Unfair Practices Act also grants powers to the Insurance

Commissioner 56 in addition to those provided elsewhere in the Insurance Code.5 7 The Commissioner is specifically delegated the authority
to examine and investigate business affairs,." issue orders to show
cause, 5 9 conduct hearings, 60 issue injunctive orders, 6 1 invoke fines and
penalties, 62 and suspend or revoke licenses for up to one year.63 Furnecesthermore, the Commissioner is empowered to promulgate rules
64

sary for proper administration of the Unfair Practices Act.
Section 790.09 of the Unfair Practices Act, the section which has
impacted the availability of a private right of action most directly, provides:
No order to cease and desist issued under this article directed to any
person or subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce
the same shall in any way relieve or absolve such person from any
administrative action against the license or certificate of such person,
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
"(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent, or broker.
"(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
"(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration.
"(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then requiring the
subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain
substantially the same information.
"(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other
portions of the insurance policy coverage.
"(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in
the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a claim or for
the offer of a compromise settlement."
54. 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 493-501 (1972).
55. Id. at 1315-16. In 1975, two more practices were designated unfair, these were
"(d]irectly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney" and "[m]isleading a
claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations." Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 790, § 1, at 1812.
56. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.04-.08, 790.10 (West 1972).
57. Id § 790.08.
58. Id § 790.04.
59. Id §§ 790.05-.06.
60. Id § 790.06.
61. Id
62. Id § 790.07.
63. Id
64. Id. § 790.10.
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civil liability or criminal penalty under the laws of this State arising
65
out of the methods, acts or practices found unfair or deceptive.

Courts have focused on this section in an attempt to determine whether
the legislature intended to allow private suits under the provisions of
66
the Unfair Practices Act.
Although the Unfair Practices Act originally was enacted in 1959,
only five cases calling for judicial determination of the existence of a
private right of action arising from those statutory provisions have
reached the appellate level. 67 Aside from Royal Globe, three of these
merit attention here.
In Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,68 an insured

brought a class action against the insurer contending that a person
seeking home loans from the carrier was required, in restraint of trade,
to buy a policy of whole life insurance from the company. These policies could have been obtained from other insurers at less cost and defendant Equitable denied the purchasers of these whole life insurance
agreements the benefits of accumulating cash values on their policies.
The suit sought damages against the insurer. The complaint alleged
that this tie-in sales agreement 69 was a restraint of trade prohibited by
70
section 790.03(c) of the Insurance Code.
The insurance company attempted to refute this allegation by asserting that enforcement of section 790.03 is exclusively within the
power of the Insurance Commissioner, so that a private litigant may
65. Id § 790.09.
66. Shernoffv. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975); Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
67. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1979); Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Live Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978,
147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978); Scheuch v. Western World Ins. Co., 145 Cal. Rptr. 294, hearing
granted 82 Cal. App. 3d 31 (1978); Shernoffv. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1975); Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
68. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
69. A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer purchase another "tied" product. These agreements are illegal per
se when a party has sufficient economic power to restain free competition in the market for
the tied product and when a substantial amount of business is foreclosed to competitors by
the tie. Id at 999, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (citing Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv.
Bureau, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 842, 856-57, 484 P.2d 953, 962, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 794 (1971)).
70. The section prohibits "[elntering into agreement to commit, or by any concerted
action committing, any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation resulting in or tending to
result in unreasonable restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance." CAL. INS.
CODE § 790.03(c) (West Supp. 1980). A tie-in agreement is generally a violation of the Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-17101 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980), California's antitrust statute. The Insurance Code, however, has been held to supercede the
Cartwright Act in the insurance field. Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal.
App. 3d at 999 n.2, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
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not bring an action based upon a violation of that section. 7 ' In response to these contentions, the court of appeal concluded:
Section 790.09 thus contemplates a private suit to impose civil liability irrespective of governmental action against the insurer for violation of a provision of the Insurance Code. The fair construction is
the civil liability runs may enforce it by an
that the person to whom
72
appropriate action.
The court, in analyzing section 790.09, relied on Crisci v. Securiy Insurance Co. ,73 in which the court imposed tort liability for bad faith failure to settle. 74 By relying on Crisci, the Greenberg court in essence
indicated that it viewed section 790.09 as preserving the tort action permitted in Crisci, rather than as creating a new cause of action. This
indication is important because, if indeed the court did consider section
790.09 as preserving an existing tort action, the court likely would have
considered the rule against third party tort actions applicable to section
790.09 as well.
Another class action, this time seeking damages against title insurers arising out of a conspiracy to fix title insurance rates, called upon
the court of appeal to interpret provisions of the unfair practices article
of the Insurance Code. In Shernoffv. Superior Court,75 a stay had been
ordered on the theory that the Insurance Commissioner had primary
jurisdiction to consider rate-fixing allegations. In dissolving the stay,
the court of appeal announced that "the commissioner's jurisdiction is
'primary,' not 'exclusive,' and in this instance he has chosen not to exercise it. ' ' 76 In addition, the court noted that section 790.0977 preserves
civil remedies even where cease and desist orders are issued. Plaintiffs
in Shernoff were seeking damages. Because the Commissioner is not
entitled to enter money judgments, the court assumed the power to do
so. 78 The decision relied heavily on the interpretation of section 790.09
espoused in Greenberg.
In 1978, in Scheuch v. Western WorldInsurance Co., 7 9 the court of
appeal considered the legality of a direct action by an injured third
party against an insurer based on the Unfair Practices Act.8 0 Although
the Scheuch case has been granted a hearing in light of Royal Globe, it
71. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
72. Id at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. The court added by footnote: "Any other construction would overturn by implication the rule of Crisciv. Security Ins. Co." 34 Cal. App.
3d at 1001 n.5, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (citation omitted).
73. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
74. See notes 26-30 & accompanying text supra.
75. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
76. Id at 409, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
77. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972).
78. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 409-10, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
79. 145 Cal. Rptr. 294, hearinggranted,82 Cal. App. 3d 31 (1978).
80. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West Supp. 1980).
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deserves consideration because it carefully interprets the purpose and
intent of section 790.03(h)(5) as it relates to the insurer liability doctrine
declared by the supreme court.
Scheuch involved an appeal from a dismissal of an action brought
by an injured third party against an insurance company. The third
party argued that the duty to enter into good faith settlement negotiations imposed by section 790.03(h)(5) of the Insurance Code created a
duty running in favor of injured third parties. 8' Therefore, he argued,
the injured third party could bring a direct action against the insured.
The court found this "rather a startling proposition." 82 In affirming the
dismissal of the third party's complaint, the court concluded that the
duty of fair dealing and good faith "arises out of the contract of insurance."'8 3 The court considered section 790.03(h)(5) as "impos[ing] no
duty on an insurer which had not already been judicially declared prior
to its enactment in 1972."84 Thus, the court decided that the duty under
section 790.03(h)(5) was coextensive with the duty of fair dealing and
good faith imposed under tort law. Referring back to Greenberg,where
the court had implied that a third party court sue an insurer directly,85
the court concluded:
What was implicit [in Greenberg] we now make explicit: Section
790.03, subdivision (h)(5), represents a legislative embodiment of the
law for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, as previously declared by the Supreme Court of this state. Appellant would
have us hold that the Legislature not only endorsed judicial declaration of the duty to settle but greatly expanded it to include injured
claimants not the insureds among the persons to whom
86 the duty is
owed. We find no justification for such a conclusion.
Thus, an analysis of the development of the private right of action
under the Insurance Code shows that the courts intended that it parallel the tort of bad faith failure to settle. Included within this parallel
was a prohibition against direct third party actions against insurers. It
was against this backdrop of judicial and legislative developments that
Royal Globe was decided.
The Decision in Royal Globe
The plaintiff in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court8 7 filed
an action for personal injuries resulting from a slip and fall accident in
81. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
82. Id In a footnote, the court acknowledged that the proposition was before the
supreme court in the Royal Globe case. Id. at 297 n.7.
83. Id at 297.
84. Id at 297-98.
85. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
86. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
87. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
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a food market. The plaintiff joined as defendants the market's insur-

ance carrier, Royal Globe, and an insurance adjuster who was an agent

of Royal Globe. The causes of action were based upon the statutory

prohibitions of the Unfair Practices Act. Two violations of Insurance
Code section 790.03(h) were alleged: first, that Royal Globe refused to
engage in a good faith attempt at settlement, 88 and second, that the
advised the claimant not to obtain the services of an attoradjuster
89
ney.
Royal Globe filed a demurrer to the complaint based on three
grounds.90 First, the insurance company contended that the Unfair
Practices Act vests exclusive enforcement power in the California In-

surance Commissioner and that no private right of action was intended
by the legislature. Additionally, even if a private right of action were

allowed, defendants argued that an injured third party claimant had no
standing to sue because the provisions of the Act were intended to benefit only the insured. Finally, Royal Globe asserted that an injured
party may not sue both-the insured and the insurer in the same action.
In determining that the Unfair Practices Act does indeed create a
private right of action, the court first considered the language of section
790.09.91 This section preserves civil liability for unfair acts which
were the subject of a cease and desist order issued by the Insurance

Commissioner. The Royal Globe court concluded that the language of
section 790.09 "appears to afford to private litigants a cause of action
against insurers which commit the unfair acts or practices. '92 The
court noted 93 that this conclusion had been reached by the courts of
appeal in Greenberg94 and Shernoff.95

Royal Globe argued that section 790.09 was not meant to create a

88. See

CAL. INS. CODE

§ 790.03(h)(5) (West Supp. 1980).

89. See id § 790.03(h)(14).
90. 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. 846.
91. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972). See text accompanying note 65 supra.
92. 23 Cal. 3d at 885, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
93. Id at 885-86, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
94. Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1973). See notes 68-72 & accompanying text supra.
95. Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975). See
notes 75-78 & accompanying text surpra. The Royal Globe opinion, in a footnote, points out
that "[a]lthough the [ShernoAf] opinion does not state expressly that the suit was based upon
the provisions of the act, this is clear from the references to sections 790.09 and 790.03 in the
opinion." 23 Cal. 3d at 886 n.3, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The court bolstered
its interpretation by declaring that the Unfair Practices Act is the only applicable statute in
this situation, since the Cartwright Act (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-17101 (West
1964 & Supp. 1980)) is inapplicable to the business of insurance. 23 Cal. 3d at 86-87, 592
P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (citing Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34
Cal. App. 3d 994, 999 n.2, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470, 474 (1973)). The court also cited Homestead
Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978), in
support of its proposition that a private right of action exists. This decision merely mentions
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new private cause of action based on violations of the Unfair Practices
Act itself but was meant to preserve causes of action already existing
under other state laws. In response, the supreme court contrasted the
model act promulgated by the NAIC with the California statute, 96 explaining simply that "while the model act states that a person shall not
be absolved of liability under any 'other' state laws, the California act
This omission, the court felt, indi. . .eliminates the word 'other.'
cated the intent of the legislature to allow a private right of action
under section 790.
The court next addressed the question of whether an insurer's duty
under the Act runs only to the insured or whether an injured claimant
may rely on the Act's provisions as the basis for a direct lawsuit. The
court pointed out that section (h) expressly extends some of its protections to claimants. For instance, the statute prohibits misleading a
claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations, 98 urging a claimant
not to consult an attorney, 99 and misrepresenting to a claimant the facts
concerning the coverage of a policy. 10 0 Certain other provisions expressly extend protections to both claimants and insureds. '0 l Nonetheless the court concluded that liability under the Act's provisions as a
whole runs to claimants as well as insureds. Although only one of the
two provisions at issue in the case specifically refers to "claimant," both
were held to extend protection to third party claimants.
The court also looked to the legislative history of the act to ascertain whether the legislature intended the provisions of subdivision (h)
to protect claimants. In so doing, it relied primarily on testimony
before legislative committees by a Department of Insurance representative,' 0 2 stating that the measure "could be construed to affect third parties."' 0 3 His observation was uncontested yet did not provoke any
change in the language of the measure. The court concluded that "it is
a reasonable implication that the committees' inaction represented a
deliberate decision that third party claimants were to enjoy the protection afforded by the bill.' °4
Royal Globe argued that the supreme court had held in Murphy v.
",97

the Unfair Practices Act provisions, however, and adds nothing pertinent to a consideration
of Royal Globe.

96.

See notes 47-50 & accompanying text supra.

97.
98.
99.

23 Cal. 3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(15) (West Supp. 1980).
Id. § 790.03(h)(14).

100.
101.

Id. § 790.03(h)(1).
Id. § 790.03(h)(10), (11).

102.
103.
104.

23 Cal. 3d at 889 n.6, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
Id at 888, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
Id at 889, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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Allstate Insurance Co. 10 5 that the insurer's duty to settle was owed
solely to the insured, was designed to protect the insured from liability
for an excess verdict, and was not intended to benefit the injured claimant. Murphy, the company argued, prevented a third party from suing
an insurer directly without first securing an assignment of the insured's
cause of action. 10 6 The Royal Globe court distinguished Murphy by
noting that, unlike the claimant in Murphy, the claimant in Royal
Globe did not rely upon a violation of the insurer's duty to itspoliyholder, but rather upon the insurer's duty owed directly to her as a
claimant under section 790.03(h)(5) and (14).107
Royal Globe also asserted that a single instance of unfair or deceptive conduct was not intended to be actionable. To violate the Unfair
Practices Act, it argued, improper conduct must be committed with sufficient frequency to demonstrate a continuing business practice. Section 790.03(h) prohibits "[k]nowingly committing or performing with
such frequency as to indicate a general business practice" any of the
enumerated unfair acts.' 0 8 The court concluded that the language is
ambiguous in that it does not clarify whether a single instance of prohibited conduct, Le., a prohibited act knowingly committed on one occasion, can provide the basis for a lawsuit, or if such improper behavior
is actionable only when committed "frequently." According to the majority opinion, it is uncertain whether the words "with such frequency"
were designed to modify both the terms "knowingly committing" and
"performing" or solely the latter.' 0 9
The court noted that this ambiguity is exacerbated by the language
of the provisions defining particular conduct as unfair.110 Some of
these provisions refer to actions in the singular' 11 and others refer to
actions in the plural. 12 To resolve this ambiguity, the court fell back
on its earlier conclusion:
If, as we conclude, the act affords a private party, including a third
party claimant, a right to sue an insurer for violating subdivision (h),
it is inconceivable that the Legislature intended such a litigant would
be required to show that the insurer committed the acts prohibited by
that provision "with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice."113
Thus, the court concluded that, once a private right of action is pre105. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976). See text accompanying
notes 33-39 supra.
106. 23 Cal. 3d at 889-90, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
107. Id
108. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West Supp. 1980). See note 53 supra.
109. 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 335-36, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
110. Id at 890-91, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
111. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(15) (West Supp. 1980).
112. E.g., id. § 790.03(h)(1).
113. 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
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sumed, a single act knowingly committed is sufficient to give rise to that
right of action.
Although it found that the Unfair Practices Act gives a third party
claimant a private cause of action, the supreme court upheld Royal
Globe's contention that the third party claimant may not sue both the
insured and the insurance company in the same lawsuit. 14 The claimant's action against the insured must first be concluded and liability
determined. A joint trial against the policyholder for negligence and
against the insurer for a violation of its statutory duties would violate
section 1155 of the Evidence Code which precludes the inherently prejliability insurance in an action to prove negliudicial use of evidence of
5
gence or wrongdoing."
An Analysis of the Court's Decision in Royal Globe
In Royal Globe the supreme court reasoned that one of the purposes of the Unfair Practices Act was to create a private right of action
for third party claimants." 16 However, the intent of the legislature
more likely was to give the Insurance Commissioner power to supervise
and regulate the business of insurance. A review of the history of the
Act, an objective examination of the language of the statute, and the
construction given to the Act by the agency empowered to enforce it,
all support the conclusion that the insurance commissioner was intended to have exclusive power to enforce the prohibitions of section
790.03.
If, despite clear legislative intent to the contrary, a private right of
action is allowed under the Unfair Practices Act, that private right
should not exist in favor of third party claimants. The rule that the
duty does not extend to third parties was clearly articulated by the
supreme court in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co. 1 7 and by the court
of appeal in Scheuch v. Western World Insurance Co." 8 There is no
fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the claimant because the
claimant cannot be harmed by the actions of the insurance company.
In addition, an alternative remedy exists at law for the injured claimant, who need only obtain an assignment of the insured's cause of action for bad faith against the insurer to recover on a judgment secured
by the claimant against the insured.
114. Id
115. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1155 (West 1966).
116. 23 Cal. 3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
117. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 941, 553 P.2d 584, 586-87, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 426-27 (1976). See
text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
118. 145 Cal. Rptr. 294, hearinggranted,82 Cal. App. 3d 31 (1978). See notes 79-86 &
accompanying text supra.
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The Private Right of Action

As discussed, the majority opinion cites the provisions of section
790.09119 to support the grant of a private civil remedy to a third party
claimant. The court asserts that because the NAIC model act provided
that a cease and desist order would not absolve a person from liability
under "other" laws of the state, while the California statute omits the
word "other," the intent of the legislature in enacting the Unfair Practices Act was to provide a vehicle for imposing liability in private actions. 120

This analysis is unconvincing. The word "other" probably was
struck as excess verbiage.121 A more plausible interpretation of this
section suggests that the section was designed to prevent a cease and
desist order issued by the Insurance Commissioner from being used
defensively by the carrier to escape civil liability or criminal penalties.
The elimination of the word "other" does not affect the rest of the language of section 709.09 which, as the dissent points out, seems "intended to preserve any civil. . . liability already provided for under
state law, rather22than to create new liability thereby changing preexisting state law."'
If the legislature had intended to impose additional civil liability
on insurers, certainly it could have expressed its intention in unambiguous language. The Unfair Practices Act was added to the Insurance
Code in 1959123 and superceded the Cartwright Act, insofar as the latter had regulated the insurance industry, 24 as the more specific statute.' 25 The Cartwright Act contains the general antitrust law of the
state and, prior to 1959, was applicable to the business of insurance.
The Cartwright Act specifically authorizes private suits and the recovery of damages. Section 17070 provides: "Any person or trade association may bring an action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this
chapter and, in addition thereto, for the recovery of damages." 126 With
the Cartwright Act as precedent, the legislature seems to have acted
deliberately in omitting an express provision allowing private action
and the recovery of damages under the Unfair Practices Act.
Furthermore, there is every indication from other sources noted by
the court that no private right of action was intended. Various forms of
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
492, 170
126.

See notes 91-97 & accompanying text supra.
23 Cal. 3d 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
The legislative history offers no explanation for this change.
23 Cal. 3d at 896, 592 P.2d at 339, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 852 (emphasis by the court).
Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1737, § 1, at 4187.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-17101 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980).
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 322, 444 P.2d 481,
Cal. Rptr. 849, 860 (1968).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17070 (West 1964).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

extrinsic evidence were submitted to the Royal Globe court to aid in the
interpretation of the Unfair Practices Act: the legislative analyst's report; the legislative counsel's digest; a letter to the trial court from the
former California Insurance Commissioner and president of the
NAIC; 127 and an excerpt from the Underwriters Report

28

for August,

1972. The legislative analyst's report on Assembly Bill 459 described
regulatory sanctions defined by the Bill in terms of powers specifically
delegated to the Insurance Commissioner. 29 The report did not even
contemplate the possibility of private suits arising from the statutory
provisions. 130 The legislative counsel's digest' 3 ' accompanying the proposed legislation described the bill as adding specified unfair claims
settlement practices "for violation of which Insurance Commissioner
may take specified actions to restrain continuation of practice." 32 The
digest does not address the issue of a private right of action arising
127. This letter from Mr. Richards D. Barger supported and amplified the position of
Royal Globe Insurance Company by analyzing the legislative intent regarding the measure
in light of its historical background. The court declined to lend any credence to Barger's
position on the ground that "the writer was not a legislator and was not acting on behalf of
the legislature in supporting the measure." Letter from Richards D. Barger to Hon. Reginald M.Watt (November 28, 1977). In the case of In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d
583, 590, 546 P.2d 1371, 1374-75, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 430 (1976), cited by the Royal Globe
court, the California Supreme Court established that the testimony of an individual legislator with regard to a particular piece of legislation is inadmissible, although an exception was
made for the letter of an assemblyman because the letter shed light on the legislative history
of a provision in controversy. The Royal Globe court also referred to a footnote in Carmona
v. Division of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303, 311-12 n.8, 530 P.2d 161, 166-67, 118 Cal. Rptr.
473, 478-79 (1975), in which the supreme court reiterated the general evidentiary exclusion
for statements made by individual lawmakers and reinforced the necessity of exclusion by
stating that "Itihe declaration at issue was prepared by an employee of one of the parties to
this litigation subsequent to the filing of judicial proceedings. The self interest inherent in
such a process removes from the declaration the appearance of impartiality necessary to
justify any reliance by the court." Mr. Barger was not a mere employee; he was the individual empowered to implement and enforce the regulatory provisions of the Insurance Code.
Certainly his interpretation of the intent and purpose of the Unfair Practices Act should
have been an influential factor in making a fair determination of this issue.
128. 67 UNDERWRITERS REP., Aug. 24, 1972, at 3.
129. Pierson, Analysis of Assembly Bill 459 (Apr. 28, 1972): "Persons found to be engaging in these unfair methods of competition who violate a cease and desist order of the
Insurance Commissioner may, after hearing, be fined up to $50, or, if the violation is found
to be willful, $500. A second violation of a cease and desist order of the Insurance Commissioner. . . may result in revocation or suspension of the license to do business for not more
than one year."
130. Id
131. When the meaning of a statute is in doubt or unclear, the supreme court, in a
decision by Justice Traynor, has supported the use of extrinsic sources to aid in interpretation. People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 182-83, 217 P.2d 1, 5 (1950). A legislative counsel's
digest would appear to be such an extrinsic source.
132. Legislative Counsel's Digest to A.B. 459 (1972).
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from the Act. Finally, in the excerpt from the UnderwritersReport
for August 1972, the then Insurance Commissioner Barger said only
that he actively sponsored and supported the enactment of the Unfair
Practices Act1 34 and promised special enforcement procedures within
the Insurance Department. 35 The possibility of a private civil action
predicated on the statute was not even considered. Although none of
these interpretations are conclusive nor binding on the court in any
sense, they do serve to indicate the consensus of opinion by others.
In addition to disregarding the opinions of others close to the
problem, the Royal Globe court extracted the pertinent provisions of
the Unfair Practices Act, those upon which the claimant's complaint
was based, and examined the language in isolation. The individual
sections of the Unfair Practices Act, commencing with section 790, cannot properly be interpreted out of context. Their meaning should be
construed in accord with the express purpose of the article. 136 Insurance Code section 790 states that "[tihe purpose of this article is to
regulate trade practices in the business of insurance." 37 Almost all the
provisions deal with the powers of the Insurance Commissioner. For
example, the remedies for infractions are clearly defined. Sections
790.03 to 790.08 specifically empower the Insurance Commissioner to
examine, investigate, and regulate the business of insurers, to issue and
serve cease and desist orders, to fine, to conduct hearings, and to suspend an insurer's license to do business in the state in appropriate situations.138 Section 790.10 authorizes the Commissioner to issue
39
reasonable rules and regulations necessary to administer the article.
Thus, when the provisions of section 790.03 are read and interpreted
within the context in which they appear in the Insurance Code, the legislative meaning seems to point distinctly toward administrative enforcement of the prohibitions.
133. 67 UNDERWRITERS REP., Aug. 24, 1972.
134. Id Cf. Ault v. Dinner For Two, Inc., 27 Cal. App. 3d 145, 149 n.2, 103 Cal. Rptr.
572, 575 (1972) (comments of Judicial Council, which had helped draft legislation, "important guide to statutory interpretation").
135. The Commissioner promised the addition of an attorney with special qualifications
to enforce the provisions of the new law, and the Consumer Services division of the Insurance Department was instructed to establish a procedure for processing claims arising out of
the new prohibitions. 67 UNDERWRITERS REP., Aug. 24, 1972, at 3.
136. This is a general rule of statutory construction. See Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222, 514 P.2d 1224, 110 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1973) (statutes to be
given ordinary and common sense construction in accordance with intent of legislature and
whole act rather than some isolated part or word of act to be considered). See also Friends
of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 256, 502 P.2d 1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr.
761, 769 (1972).
137. CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1972).
138. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.03-790.08 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980).
139. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.10 (West 1972).
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The express purpose of the Unfair Practices Act as stated in the
provisions of section 790, as derived from an analysis of its legislative
history and as interpreted by experts involved in its enactment and enforcement, should provide convincing evidence of the legislature's intention to produce a regulatory statute expanding the power of the
insurance commissioner. If this is not dispositive of the issue, then the
following critical examination of the language of the statute in question
should dispel any doubts. The word-by-word analysis of section
790.03(h) which follows provides further support for the proposition
that the section was not intended to create a private right of action.
Section 790.03(h) prohibits "[klnowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice" any
of the unfair practices set forth. This multiple violation requirement
seems expressly to preclude the possibility of private action, except perhaps in the extremely unlikely situation of a single litigant victimized
by repeated statutory violations of a single insurer. The Royal Globe
court claimed this language is "ambiguous."' 140 The majority further
contended that it is difficult to determine whether the words "with such
frequency" were intended to modify both the terms "knowingly committing" and "performing" or solely the latter. 141 The relevance of this
dispute is that, by using the adverb "knowingly" to modify only the
verb "committing," it is possible to divide this preamble into two independent phrases, both related only to "any of the following unfair
claims settlement practices." Such a reading results in a mere knowledge requirement rather than a showing of multiple violations. The
NAIC model act does not contain the word "knowingly."' 142 Consequently, the members of the NAIC suggested that the phrase "without
just cause" be inserted following the word "performing" to avoid the
imposition of harsh penalties for innocent violations. 143 The same concern apparently was shared by the California Legislature as it moved to
enact Assembly Bill 459 into law, for the Bill was amended to insert the
word "knowingly," before "committing."' 144 Read without the word
"knowingly," as the clause appears in the model act, there is little
140.

23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.

141.

Id at 890, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.

142.

1 NAIC

PROCEEDINGS

495, § 4(9) Unfair Claim Settlement Practices (1972).

143. Id at 503, T 1: "In the prefatory language, we believe the phrase 'without just cause
and' ought to be inserted following the word 'performing'. . . . [P]articularly since monetary penalties can be imposed for violation of the law, we believe it only fair that some
allowance ought to be made for innocent violations in this area. It can be argued that the
clause 'with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice' negates the possibility
of 'just cause' becoming an issue. We are not that confident as to the impact of these standards upon our complex industry. Therefore we believe some allowance should be made in

this area. .

.

.Certainly it is not the intent of the law to punish acts done with just cause."

144. A.B. 459, as amended in Senate, June 21, 1972, California Legislature, Regular
Session (1972).
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doubt that the frequency clause modifies both "committing" and "performing."
The Royal Globe court used the word "knowingly" to separate
"committing" from "performing" for determining which words the frequency clause modifies. In the court's view "knowingly" supplies the
scienter requirement to "committing" that "with such frequency" supplies to "performing." The absence of "knowingly" in the model act,
however, destroys the basis for the court's distinction. If California had
used the words "without just cause," as suggested by the NAIC, the
words obviously would apply to both "committing" and "performing."
It is unlikely that by substituting the word "knowingly" the legislature
intended to alter this construction.
In dissent, Justice Richardson characterized the majority's wordby-word analysis as "erroneous in its labored attempt to find an ambiguity where none whatever exists."' 145 The dissent contended that
"knowingly" modified both "committing" and "performing," since one
could not "unknowingly" commit or perform any of the enumerated
violations in 790.03(h). The dissent also noted that there is no comma
separating the words "committing or performing," which suggests that
they should be read together.' 46 Further, if these words are read together, then the adverb "knowingly" modifies both; it is logical and
consistent that the frequency clause was similarly intended to modify
both words.
Rather than base its holding on the language of the subsection at
issue, the majority defended its interpretation of the legislative intent
by asserting its own prior conclusion. The court declared: "Although
the language of the statute is not clear, if the premise is accepted that a
private party may bring an action. . ., then a single violation knowingly committed is a sufficient basis for such an action." 47 The court's
reasoning may be rephrased as follows: since a private right of action is
assumed, a single violation must be actionable because a private party
surely would not be expected to prove violations other than the one
against him or her. Consequently, the frequency requirement cannot
be used to invalidate the existence of a private right of action. This
reading circumvents the apparent intent and logical meaning of the
Act's provisions.
145. 23 Cal. 3d at 894, 592 P.2d at 338, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 851 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
146. Id Section 790.03(h) reads "[knowingly committing or performing with such frequency," CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1980), as contrasted with "knowingly
committing, or performing with such frequency." It also should be noted that only 4 of 15
subsections in 790.03(h) are phrased in the singular (subsections 7, 13, 14, 15), and those four
are probably so phrased simply because the concepts would be difficult to express in plural
form. See note 65 supra. This is further evidence that the legislature was concerned with a
pattern of violations rather than with a single violation.
147. 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
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The more likely reason for the existence of the "frequency" clause
is to preclude liability for a single instance of unfair conduct by requiring the Insurance Commissioner to establish that the conduct amounts
to a general business practice. This is the interpretation given to this
section by the Department of Insurance. This interpretation is significant; apparent ambiguities in the language of a statute often may be
resolved by the contemporaneous construction of the statute by the legislature or by the administrative agencies charged with implementing
out: "The majority wholly
the new enactment. 4 8 As the dissent points
49
ignores this well established principle."'
Moreover, the interpretation by the Department of Insurance is
consistent with its general practice. The Department of Insurance does
not act upon a single violation of section 790.03(h) but requires evidence of a general business practice. 1 50 Occasional conduct is not the
subject of examination, investigation, or an order to show cause, nor
does it provoke exercise of the injunctive or suspension powers of the
commissioner given by the Act. Furthermore, the present California
Insurance Commissioner, responsible for the enforcement of the Act,
submitted an amicus curiae brief, at the request of the court, which
supports the contention of Royal Globe that the Act was never intended to create a private action.151
148. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 246, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300-01, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978).
149. 23 Cal. 3d at 897, 592 P.2d at 340, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 853 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
150. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 897, 592 P.2d at 340, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 853 (citing amicus brief). The court stated: "[Slince its enactment [sic], the Department has consistently construed that Section [CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp.
1980)] to require a general business practice in order to establish a violation." Id
151. Amicus Brief of the Department of Insurance at 10, Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), called for judicial interpretation of § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), regarding the appropriateness of a private remedy. The
Securities and Exchange Commission intervened as amicus curiae, bringing to the Court's
attention its limited resources, which would seem to indicate a recognition of private remedies as an adjunct to its own enforcement powers. In contrast, the Insurance Department
asserted in Royal Globe that a private remedy might serve to thwart rather than benefit its
enforcement programs. Amicus Brief of the Department of Insurance at 5, Royal Globe Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
The manner in which other states interpret their versions of the model act could shed
some light on the Royal Globe interpretation. The issue of a private right of action under an
unfair claims settlement practices statute has not often been litigated. No other state has
allowed direct action by a third party claimant based on a statutory right, even after determination of liability of the insured. A New Jersey court, in interpreting statutes regulating
the insurance industry in that state (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:29B- I to
17:29B-14 (West 1970 & Supp. 1979-80)), held that the regulation of the business of insurance deals with a public wrong and does not give rise to individual or private causes of
action. The superior court refused to allow direct "action" by an insured for an alleged
unfair rate discrimination practice by an insurer providing group health and accident cover-
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There is thus a considerable amount of evidence, much of it
presented to the Royal Globe court, that suggests that section 790.03(h)

was not intended to create a private right of action. Actions by the
legislature, the Department of Insurance, and the drafters of the NAIC

model act all support that conclusion. A critical examination of the
language in question does likewise. The evidence to the contrary is
hardly as convincing.
Extending the Private Action to Third Party Claimants
Even if a private action exists under the Unfair Practices Act, the

duty to settle imposed by section 790.03(h)(5) runs only to the insured
and not to the injured third party claimant. Four arguments support
this conclusion.
First, the third party claimant cannot be said to have been directly

injured by the insurer's breach of duty. As the court reasoned in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co., 152 a direct benefit does not flow to the
claimant from the duty to settle; indeed, he or she actually stands to

gain from the duty's breach. Instead of receiving a settlement at or
near policy limits, the claimant may receive an award in excess of pol-

icy coverage.153 Thus, the breach of duty to the insured, not the existence of any duty to the claimant, should be the focus of insurer

liability.
Second, the implied in law duty of the insurer stems from the fun-

damental promise of the insurer to protect the insured from exposure to
liability up to the agreed upon limits. To provide this protection, the
insurer must be in command of any defense to the action, including
age. Retail Clerks Welfare Fund, Local 1049 v. Continental Casualty Co., 71 N.L Super.
221, 176 A.2d 524 (1961). In Alvarez v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 562 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1978), the court ruled simply that "[article] 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code of the
State of Texas does not authorize suits of any kind by a private citizen." Id at 264. A
Massachusetts court required an insured to exhaust administrative remedies before the
Commissioner of Insurance prior to bringing private action under the state consumer protection unfair practices provisions (current version at MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A §§ 1-11
(West 1972 & Supp. 1980)). Gordon v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 281 N.E. 2d 573, 576
(Mass. 1972). In 1977, a New York court allowed a private suit under N.Y. INS. LAW § 40-d
(McKinney Supp. 1979-80). Despite the wording of the statute, which limits enforcement to
the state, the court allowed a common-law-type of private suit by insureds injured by the
unfair or deceptive practices of their insurance carriers. Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle
Star Ins. Co., 89 Misc. 2d 822, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (1977).
Three states that specifically authorize direct suits by third party claimants against insurers prior to a determination of liability on the part of the insured are Louisiana, LA. Rav.
STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-1 (1979); and Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (West Supp. 1979).
152. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
153. .d at 941, 553 P.2d at 588, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27. See text accompanying notes
33-39 supra.
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settlement negotiations. As a result, an inherent conflict of interest develops between the carrier bound to indemnify the insured up to policy
limits and the insured, when potential damages exceed these policy
limits. The duty to deal fairly compels the insurer to give as much
154
consideration to the interests of the insured as it does to its own.
This compulsion does not exist between insurer and injured claimant.
The insurer has not promised to discharge liability incurred by the
third party. The insurer does not control litigation and settlement negotiations on behalf of the claimant. Moreover, the insurer does not
represent the injured claimant; therefore, there is no opportunity for
any conflict of interest.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how the actions of the insurer
could be damaging to a third party claimant. If there is a bona fide
dispute, then refusal to settle will be supported by judicial determination. If the insurance company is found to have acted in bad faith by
refusing to settle, the claimant stands to benefit from a judgment in
excess of policy limits, as recognized by the supreme court in the Murphy decision. 1 55 Hence, the relationship between insurer and insured,
which was the basis for providing a private right of action for the insured, bears no resemblance to the relationship between insured and
claimant. Consequently, some other rationale need be found to support a third party right of action.
In fact, the California Supreme Court rejected other bases for that
right of action in Murphy. The Royal Globe court distinguished Murphy on the ground that it was decided solely on contractual principles.
Royal Globe held that the third party in that case did not rely on the
implied in law duty to settle but rather on a statutory duty owed directly to the claimant. This distinction, however, highlights the third
difficulty with the court's decision to extend a private right of action to
third parties. The court failed to acknowledge that the duty to settle
under section 790.03(h)(5) had been interpreted as simply a legislative
embodiment of the judicially declared duty to deal fairly and in good
faith.'15756 This was the reasoning in Scheuch v. Western World Insurance
Co.,
where the court concluded there was no basis for finding that
158
the legislature expanded the insurer's duty to settle.
Finally, the majority seized on the fact that some of the sections of
the Unfair Practices Act specifically mention the word "claimant." It
seems clear, however, that the intent behind the Act was to provide
154.
(1958).
155.
156.
157.
158.

Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201
See
See
145
See

text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
text accompanying notes 79-86 supra.
Cal. Rptr. 294, hearinggranted,82 Cal. App. 3d 31 (1978).
text accompanying note 86 supra.
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protection for claimants through agency enforcement of the regulations
and not to create any right in the claimant. 159
The court's decision was soon followed by the introduction in California of a Senate Bill designed to modify the holding in Royal
Globe.160 As first proposed, the measure would have allowed only the
California Insurance Commissioner to bring actions under section
790.03(h), eliminating the right of action of insureds, as well as that of
third party claimants under the Unfair Practices Act. 16 1 The bill passed
howthe state Senate in this form on June 1, 1979.162 Subsequently,
64
ever, the bill was amended 163 to permit actions by insureds1
Although the bill eliminates the word "committing" from section
790.03(h), it still requires that the insurer be "[k]nowingly performing
with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice" the forbidden acts.165 As the Department of Insurance has taken the position
that records of complaints against an insurer are confidential, 166 proof
of the requisite frequency of an insurer's unfair practices may be all but
impossible. Thus, although the bill permits a private right of action by
an insured, the possibility of recovery under that right appears limited.
One final aspect of the bill bears mentioning. The bill expressly
declares that it "shall not modify any rights any party may have under
any other law or theory or recovery."' 167 This makes express that the
legislature did not intend to abrogate the judicially imposed duty to
deal fairly and in good faith. In addition, the bill permits the assignment of "any right of action by an insured to a third party claimant
159. See notes 98-101 & accompanying text supra.
160. Cal. S.B. 483 (1979) (as amended).
161. Cal. S.B. 483 (1979) (as amended in Senate, May 30, 1979).
162.

210 SENATE WEEKLY HISTORY 103 (1980).

163. Critics of the bill had charged that the insurance commissioner had shown a reluctance to enforce the provisions of the Act by not filing suit after receiving consumer complaints. Jackson, InsurersMay Drop Fghtto Limit Bad-FaithSuits, The Los Angeles Daily
Journal, Aug. 30, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
164. Cal. S.B. 483 (1979) (as amended). The amended bill explicitly prohibits third
party actions.
The bill also increases the enforcement powers of the insurance commissioner by allowing the imposition of fines and license suspension and revocation; permits prejudgment
interest in cases where a party's offer to settle is refused by the insurer and judgment is later
entered in favor of that party; and requires that records of unfair practice examinations and
investigations by the insurance commissioner be retained for at least 5 years. Id
165. Id The bill requires that the commissioner establish "guidelines for determining
the prima facie existence of a 'general business practice.'" Id
166. Jackson, InsurersMay Drop Fightto Limit Bad-FaithSuits, The Los Angeles Daily
Journal, Aug. 30, 1979, at 1, col. 2; 23, col. 1. During hearings before the assembly committee, the Department of insurance objected to an amendment of the bill which would have
required the insurance commissioner to make its records public. Id
167. Cal. S.B. 483 (as amended).
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[sic]. ' ' 168

This makes clear that the long permitted assignments of tort
claims by insureds continues. Moreover, that provision apparently will
permit the assignment of the statutory right of action.
Although the bill has passed the Senate, it bogged down in the
Assembly. The bill currently is in the Ways and Means Committee,
and no hearing on it is anticipated in the near future. 169 Thus, at least
for the present, Royal Globe remains "good" law.
Conclusion
The majority opinion in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court' 70 is a strained interpretation of the Unfair Practices Act. The
holding ignores clear statutory language and disregards interpretation
of the statute by the agency empowered to enforce it. The ruling
thwarts the nature and purpose of the legislation, which is to provide
an administrative regulatory scheme in the insurance industry.
The majority opinion makes an abrupt departure from prior California decisional law by creating a cause of action against an insurance
company on behalf of a third party claimant, despite the holding in
Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co. 17 1 In Murphy, the supreme court
ruled unanimously that the implied in law duty of the insurer to settle
in good faith only inures to the insured. A more recent appellate deci72
sion followed the same reasoning.
There have been no prior supreme court decisions construing section 790.03(h) of the Insurance Code. As such, Royal Globe is a policymaking decision having a powerful effect on the insurance industry and
broad ramifications for the courts and the public. The departure from
established case law undoubtedly will have a drastic effect on the judicial system and the insurance industry as well.
One result of this decision is that every time a demand is now
made to settle a lawsuit, an additional demand is likely to be forthcoming to coerce higher settlements. The demand now carries the threat
that, unless settlement is immediate, a separate suit will be filed for
violation of the Unfair Practices Act. The public ultimately will be affected by the additional drain on judicial resources. Moreover, the
public will indeed suffer from escalating costs of insurance coverage, a
certain result of inflated settlements and costly litigation.
Because an insurer is more likely to be exposed to liability from a
separate third party claimant suit than from fault finding by the insur168.
169.

170.
171.
172.
App. 3d

Id
Telephone call to offices of Senator Robert Beverly (Mar. 25, 1980).

23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
Scheuch v. Western World Ins. Co., 145 Cal. Rptr. 294, hearinggranted, 82 Cal.
31 (1978).
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ance commissioner, an insurance company will be strongly inclined to
settle with the third party, perhaps even at the expense of the insured.
In situations where the insured's interest in protection of his or her personal or business reputation is involved, the economic motive of the
insurer in protecting itself against an unfair claims practice lawsuit is
opposed to the interest of the insured. The interests of the insured in
protecting his or her insurance record and in keeping insurance premiums as low as possible are placed in direct conflict with the interests of
the insurer by the ruling in Royal Globe. The creation of a private right
of action by a court carries an obligation to analyze the ramifications of
the asserted private remedy and to evaluate these in view of the policies
and objectives of the legislature.173 In Royal Globe the task required a
careful analysis of the purpose of a liability insurance policy, the intent
and protection of the contracting parties, the interests of the injured
claimant, the purpose of the controlling legislation, and a prudent consideration of the natural outcome of the judgment. The decision of the
court failed to give due consideration to these important concerns. As
Justice Richardson so forcefully stated in his dissent: "[Tihe action
accomplishes a result which
. . .is squarely contrary to prior law, and
'' T
is clearly violative of legislative intent. 7

173. See text accompanying notes 119-51 supra.
174. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 892, 592 P.2d 329, 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 850 (1979).

